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Abstract: Recent studies have shown that malicious Internet traffic such as Denial of Service (DoS)
packets introduces distribution error and perturbs the self-similarity property of network traffic. As a
result, Loss of Self-Similarity (LoSS) is detected due to the abnormal traffic packets hence degrading
the Quality of Service (QoS) performance. In order to fulfill the demand for high speed and accuracy
for online Internet traffic monitoring, we propose LoSS detection with second order self-similarity
statistical (SOSS) model and estimate the self-similarity parameter using the Optimization Method
(OM). We test our approach using synthetic and real traffic data. For the former, we use fractional
Gaussian noise (FGN) generator, while for the latter we use FSKSMNet simulation dataset. We
investigate the behavior of self-similarity property for normal and abnormal traffic packets with
different aggregation sampling level (m). The results show that normal Internet activities preserve
exact self-similarity property while abnormal traffic perturbs the structure of self-similarity property.
The results also demonstrate that fixed m is not sufficient to detect distribution error accurately.
Accordingly, we suggest a multi-level aggregation sampling approach to improve the accuracy of
LoSS detection.
Keywords: Loss of Self-Similarity (LoSS) detection, Second Order Self-Similarity (SOSS), Multi-
Level Aggregation Sampling.
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of self-similarity and the related concept of long-range dependent (LRD) in the field of
network traffic and performance analysis is introduced in [7] and followed by [8]. Self-similarity
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describes the phenomenon in which the behavior of a process is preserved irrespective of scaling in
space or time. The knowledge of LRD states that network traffic always exhibit long-term memory
such that its behavior across widely separated times is correlated. This finding was in contrast to
widely accepted Poisson model of the network traffic, which is memoryless and inter-arrival times are
exponentially distributed. The founding challenged the validity of the Poisson assumption and shifted
the community’s focus from assuming memoryless and smooth behavior network traffic to assuming
LRD and bursty behavior.
Previous works had pointed out several causes of the self-similarity phenomenon. One is the
mixed behavior of TCP services model such as log-normal, log-extreme and Pareto distributions [13].
Another one is the mixture of actions from individual users, hardware and software in interconnecting
networks [2]. The third reason is the heavy-tailed distribution of file sizes where huge transferred files
occurred with non-negligible probability [2]. The work done in [3] and [12] showed that congestion
due to uncontrolled self-similarity structure degrades Quality of Service (QoS) performance by
drastically increasing queuing delay and packet loss.
Protocol intensity distribution plays an important role to the interactions that produce self-
similarity behavior [13]. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks with very high bit rate injection packets can
dominate the traffic protocol and produce distribution error, hence disturb the property of self-similar
behavior [14]. As a result, Loss of Self-Similarity (LoSS) behavior is detected [14] and as shown in [1]
and [10], this can be used as a flag to alert security analysts of the possible presence of a malicious
action, provided that the normal traffic background is self-similar which is a common network traffic
attribute.
The work in [1] has presented a new technique for detecting the possible presence of new DoS
attacks without a template of the background traffic. The method used LoSS definition with the self-
similarity or Hurst parameter beyond normal LRD self-similarity behavior (0.5<H<1) using the
Periodogram and the Whittle methods. However, new methods of estimating Hurst parameter which is
more accurate and faster had been developed such as the Optimization Method (OM) [4], [5] which
used the second order self-similarity statistical (SOSS) model. In this paper, we present a new LoSS
detection method using SOSS model and OM.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents mathematical definitions and properties of
SOSS and how to estimate its parameter. Section 3 on the other hand, discusses the concept of LoSS
detection and related work. Section 4 discusses the datasets that were used in the simulations while
Section 5 presents our experiment procedure and the results. Finally our conclusions and future work
directions are summarized in Section 6.
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2. SOSS STATISTICAL MODEL
Let { ( ), }0,1, 2,....,X X t t N  be a second-order stationary process with constant mean  , finite
variance 2 , and autocorrelation function ( )k that depends only on the integer k. Their definitions
are given as follows:
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Let ( ) ( )m k  and ( ) ( )m k denote the variance and autocorrelation function of ( )mX respectively. X is
called exactly second-order self-similar (ESOSS) if
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Exact self-similar process occurs when ( )( ) ( )mk k   for all m≥1. Thus, second order self-
similarity captures the property of correlation structure preserving under time aggregation and
represented by 2 2 2
1
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     for ASOSS. In second-order stationary for 0<H<1 and
H≠0.5, the autocorrelation function ( )k  satisfies 2 2( ) (2 1) ,Hk H H k k      . In particular,
if 0.5<H<1, ( )k  asymptotically behaves as ck  for 0<β<1 where cr > 0 is a constant and β=2-2H.
More details about the SOSS model can be found at [7], [8] and [11].
There are several methods to estimate H. In this paper we will be using the Optimization Method
(OM) which was developed in [4], [5] and was shown to be comparatively fast and accurate with
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respect to other methods. The method is based on how near sample autocorrelation measure fits to
ESOSS model. The estimation method defines error fitting function EK(β) as
2
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( ( ( ) ( ))
4
K
K n
k
E k k
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  

   where ρ(k) denotes the autocorrelation function of the model with
parameter β that OM would like to fit the data to, ρn(k) is the sample autocorrelation function of the
data, k is autocorrelation lag and K is the largest value of k for which ρn(k) is to be computed to reduce
edge effects. The estimation of parameter β is based on optimizing EK(β) with threshold value ≤ 10-3 is
chosen empirically [4].
3. LOSS DETECTION
The ESOSS model preserves the second order distribution property at all levels of time scale
aggregation. It is equivalent to distribution ratio of higher scale to lower scale such that:
( )
( )
H x ta
x at

 , where x(t) is distribution at higher scale, x(at) is distribution at lower scale
and parameter a,H >0.
It has been proven that in the presence of DoS attacks, the self-similarity property is disturbed hence
LoSS is detected as shown in [1], [14] and [14]. The LoSS detection in [14] used the abrupt change
property of Ha as an indicator to the existence of distribution error. However, the work did not
suggesting at what level of ‘a’ should be used for revealing the abrupt change of Ha significantly.
Alternatively, instead of using distribution ratio, the work in [1] defines LoSS as Hurst value
beyond normal range of LRD which is 0.5≤ H≤0.99 using Periodogram and Whittle method. The
results show that the method can detect new DoS attack pattern without specific normal template. The
results also demonstrate that the method has high detection rate with an average of 60% to 84% which
depends on the intensity of the attack packets. Recently, a new method of estimating Hurst parameter
which is more accurate and faster was developed in [4] and [5]. The method is known as the
Optimization Method (OM) and it is based on the SOSS model. Therefore, we propose a new
approach of LoSS detection based on SOSS model in order to improve detection accuracy.
The foundation of SOSS model is the stationary concept of higher order distribution. Internet
traffic is considered as normal behavior when the traffic is near to self-similarity model while
otherwise it is considered as abnormal behavior [14]. In the presence of malicious traffic such as DoS
packets, they introduce distribution error and shift the stationary property toward non-stationary as
shown in [1], [14] and [14], hence LoSS is detected. Data insufficient probability and detection loss
probability are two important attributes that can influence the correctness of anomaly detection [14].
The data insufficient probability is to identify minimum requirement window size to obtain reliable
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self-similarity measurement, while detection loss probability is probability where non-stationary data is
detected. LoSS is detected if it fulfils two conditions where it must be longer than minimum window
size and it must be non-stationary. Experiments have shown in [7] and [8] windows sizes from 15-30
minutes are practical and sufficient for modern LANs Ethernet Internet traffic to comply with data
insufficient probability. Self-similarity tests become more sensitive as the window size get smaller and
consequently generate false alarms if it gets too small.
A current study on self-similarity measurement used the OM in [4] and [5] provides Hurst
estimation with increased calculation speed and maintain high estimation accuracy. In addition the
method also provides a technique to identify whether the data tend toward the self-similarity model
according to the curve-fitting error value calculated [15]. To this end, we define normal behavior of
self-similarity traffic as the estimated Hurst ( H ) with OM is in LRD range such that 0.5 1H  ,
provided data insufficient probability and fitting error KE ≤10
-3 are fulfilled. Otherwise if KE >10
-3
LoSS is detected and we refer this as abnormal behavior for Internet traffic. The ESOSS process refers
to ( )( ) ( )mk k   for all 1m  . Thus, SOSS captures the property of correlation structure which is
preserved under time aggregation. Therefore it is required to study the effect of different aggregation
sampling value such as m=10, 100 and 500 to detect any changes of self-similarity property in order to
reveal any hidden distribution error accurately.
4. DATA PREPARATION
We prepare two sets of data to investigate the pattern of normal and abnormal self-similarity behavior.
The former used fractional Gaussian noise (FGN) that will generate synthetic traffic which is ESOSS
and the latter used FSKSMNet Internet traffic simulation on September 29, 2006 at Faculty of
Computer Science and Information (FSKSM) LANs.
4.1 Synthetic Self-Similar Generator with FGN
We generate at random synthetic trace that will exhibit exact self-similarity behavior by using
fractional Gaussian noise (FGN) model developed in [6] for 0.5<H<1. The length of the trace is
equivalent to 15-30 minute at normal traffic Ethernet LAN as used in [7] and [8]. The synthetic trace
is sampled with aggregation level m for m=10, 100 and 500. Then, this dataset is used to investigate
the self-similarity property at different aggregation levels of m.
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4.2 Simulation of Internet Traffic FSKSMNet
We set an Internet Monitoring Laboratory (InMonLab) with baseline 100BaseFX Fast Ethernet as
LAN backbone of FSKSM and connected to main university Gigabit backbone. Network design at
FSKSM is constructed with ten proxies of Virtual LANs. There are seven VLAN segments for
undergraduate students and one VLAN segment for postgraduate students. Administrators and
academic staffs are allocated with one VLAN segment each. The number of students that are currently
enrolled at FSKSM is more than one thousand and the number of staff is about one hundred and fifty.
We capture internet protocol packets with tcpdump software and each of capturing session is about 30
minutes.
We divide our Internet traffic simulation activities into normal and abnormal traffic. For normal
Internet activities we define as legal Internet activities as set by faculty network policy. We do not
disturb normal Internet activities and do passive sniffing at main router inside InMonLab. For
abnormal traffic, we inject at certain rate Denial of Service (DoS) flooding packets into FSKSM
network infrastructure such that they will disturb the normal behavior of self-similarity pattern. We
launch TCP SYN packets from Packet Injection node to Honeynet server. However we limit the time
stressor for each session to less than two minute to minimize the bandwidth effect. The details
simulation traces of synthetic FGN and real traffic of FSKSMNet at FSKSM LANs are shown in Table
1 and each slot contains 30 minutes capturing session.
Table 1. Synthetic FGN and Simulation of FSKSMnet on September29, 2006.
Trace Class Capture Total Packet DoS Packet
FGN-1 Synthetic ≈ 30min 180,000 (equally m=10ms)
F-Net2 N 12.15pm-
12.45pm
IP=3846328: TCP(97.94%),
UDP(1.91%), ICMP(0.11%),
IGMP(0.01%), Others(0.03%)
F-Net3 N 1.45pm-
2.15pm
IP=4197509: TCP(97.87%),
UDP(1.69%), ICMP(0.12%),
IGMP(0.01%), Others(0.31%)
F-Net4 AB 3.45pm-
4.15pm
IP=8932254: TCP(93.73%),
UDP(1.20%), ICMP(0.04%),
IGMP(0.003%), Others(5.021%)
TCP SYN(58.5%)
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From Table 1, F-Net 2 and F-Net3 traces represent normal traffic activities which do not contain
DoS packets. The normal traffic is labeled as N. The total of normal IP packet is about four millions
with TCP >95%, UDP < 2%, ICMP, IGMP and others <1%. We simulate abnormal traffic F-Net4 with
TCP SYN attack and labeled as AB. The abnormal traffic contains almost doubles IP packets as
compared to normal which is more than eight millions. We sample the traces with m=10, 100 and 500
in order to investigate how normal and abnormal traffic preserve self-similarity property. Table 2
shows window sizes of different sampling m values for synthetic FGN and real Internet traffic
FSKSMnet datasets. We assume that all simulation traffic traces have fulfilled the minimum windows
requirement. Then the estimated Hurst parameter can be used to classify whether or not the traffic
follows ESOSS model.
Table 2. Aggregation (m) and Window Size.
Window Size
Level m
FGN FSKSMnet
1 10 180000 173998
2 100 18000 17399
3 500 3600 3479
5. Empirical Analyses
5.1 LoSS Behavior Detection
Our experiments have two purposes. First, to identify the normal traces which follow ESOSS model
and second, to investigate how self-similarity property is preserved at different levels of sampling m
for normal and abnormal Internet traffic. Throughout the experiments, we set threshold fitting error
equal to 10-3 and estimate Hurst using OM with K=200.
Table 3 shows the result of Hurst estimation for Synthetic FGN and FSKSMnet traffic while Table
4 shows variance Hurst and error for different levels of m. Table 3 shows clearly that synthetic FGN-1
and F-Net3 traces follow normal self-similar behavior for all m. However, for F-Net2 and F-Net4
traces they have two different classes; at lower m=10 and 100, the traces are categorized as normal
self-similar behavior while at higher m=500 the traces deviate from normal behavior. In our simulation
F-Net4 trace contains DoS packets and is known as abnormal traffic. The malicious packets of DoS
attacks have extremely high bit rate transfer and their structure become dominant hence introduce error
to self-similar model. Similarly, legal Internet traffic F-Net2 trace is also identified as contained
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structure that contributes error to the model. However, the error can only be revealed at certain level
of m. This can be shown clearly in Table 3 which the error is hidden at m=10 and 100 but exposed at
m=500.
Table 3. Hurst estimation for FGN and FSKSMnet.
5.2 Autocorrelation Structure of Normal and Abnormal Internet Traffic Behavior
We use the ESOSS autocorrelation structure of ( )k to examine in details how self-similarity
structure is preserved at different levels of sampling m. We divide our observation into two categories
that are normal-normal and normal-abnormal patterns.
Case I: Normal-Normal
We define normal-normal behavior as the ( )k structure preserved the LRD property for all m.
Figure 1 (a) and (b) show the ( )k structure of FGN-1 and F-Net3 traces preserved the LRD structure
for m=10,100 and 500. The traces have produced normal behavior pattern in two ways. First, FGN-1
and F-Net3 traces follows SOSS model at all m which indicate by fitting error less than 10-3. Second,
the variance of multi-level sampling Hurst value and variance of multi-level fitting error value are
small which Var(m-H) is less than 5.5x10-4 and Var(m-Error is less than 10-6. Table 4 shows the
details.
m=10 m=100 m=500
Trace
Hurst Error Hurst Error Hurst Error
FGN-1 0.87 0.00004 0.86 0.00003 0.84 0.00014
F-Net2 0.82 0.00042 0.87 0.00029 0.82 0.00278
F-Net3 0.89 0.00050 0.93 0.00011 0.93 0.00027
F-Net4 0.97 0.00042 0.96 0.00033 0.90 0.01265
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Figure 1. Normal self-similarity property of FGN-1 (a) and F-Net3 (b).
Table 4. Variance of Hurst and Fitting Error for different m.
Trace Var(m-H) Var(m-Error)
FGN-1 0.000233333 0.00000000370
F-Net2 0.000833333 0.00000196443
F-Net3 0.000533333 0.00000003843
F-Net4 0.001433333 0.00005022723
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Case II: Normal-Abnormal
We define normal-abnormal behavior as the ( )k structure is preserved at lower m however its lost
LRD structure at higher m. As shown in Figure 2(a) and (b), the ( )k structure of F-Net2 and F-Net4
traces do follow LRD property at lower m=10 and 100, however at higher m=500 they don’t. Table 2
shows the abnormal traces of F-Net2 and F-Net4 have fitting error less than 10-3 for m=10 and 100.
However, the error exceeds the threshold for m=500. The disturbance of ( )k structure is shown
clearly in Figure 2 (a) and (b). Moreover, the variance of multi-level sampling Hurst and variance of
multi-level fitting error are large which indicate by Var(m-H) bigger than 5.5x10-4 and Var(m-Error)
bigger than 10-6. The details are shown in Table 4.
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Figure 2. Abnormal self-similarity property of F-Net2 (a) and F-Net4 (b).
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It is possible for legal Internet activities to contribute error and disturb the self-similarity property of
the network traffic. In our simulation, the disturbance of self-similarity error distribution is hidden at
lower sampling value but exposed at higher sampling value. This can be shown by F-Net2 in Figure
2(a) where the self-similarity is preserved at sampling level m=10 and 100 but the error is obviously
exposed at sampling level m=500. Therefore, it is clearly demonstrated in the experiments that fixed
sampling m is not enough to detect anomaly behavior of the traces accurately. The experiments also
illustrate that LoSS analysis with multi-level approach is a good direction to improve the accuracy of
anomaly traffic behavior detection.
From the observation we can define normal and abnormal Internet traffic behavior based on LoSS
detection with multi-level approach. To this end, we consider three parameters to detect LoSS
accurately which are LRD property, estimated Hurst and fitting error at aggregation sampling level m.
Let us define the following:
A=H0.5<H<1,
B= fitting error <Threshold (at normal m),
C= fitting error < Threshold (at higher m).
We define normal behavior as the traffic is following self-similarity LRD property and LoSS is not
detected at both normal and multi-level sampling m such that it fulfilled the condition of A B  C.
On the other hand, abnormal behavior is detected when Internet traffic deviates from self-similarity
property such that LoSS is detected at either normal or multi-level sampling m such that it follow the
condition of B’  C’. Normal aggregation here refers to m=10ms and 100ms which is used for Hurst
estimation in [4], [5], [7], [8] and [14] while higher aggregation we set m randomly equal to 500ms.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the implementation of LoSS detection with SOSS model. From our simulation
results, legal and malicious Internet traffic activities are possible to contribute distribution error which
deviate autocorrelation structure from self-similarity LRD model. This can be shown clearly when
fitting error of autocorrelation structure exceeds the threshold value. However, our simulation results
illustrate that the self-similarity distribution error was hidden at lower level of m such as m=10 or 100,
but exposed at higher level of m such as m=500. We believe this can be possible reason why anomaly
detection of Internet traffic behavior which based on LoSS model gives high false alarm detection rate
when the self-similarity parameter is estimated only at fixed level of sampling level such as 10ms or
100ms. Therefore, our future work we will consider a multi-level sampling aggregation approach in
order to increase the accuracy of LoSS detection base on SOSS model. We will also consider a wider
range of Internet traffic traces and different types of malicious Internet activities to test the robustness
Jilid 19, Bil.2(Disember 2007) Jurnal Teknologi Maklumat
33
and reliability of our methods toward development of efficient Internet traffic anomaly detection
systems.
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